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down the parties' arguments. First, Patrick listed the main points that the District would have made, including arguments on preemption and the Dormant
Commerce Clause. For pre-emption, the District interpreted the provision regarding sub-basin five as allowing it to divert water from a tributary in Oklahoma. In other words, the District sought to prove that the plain language of
the provision created a sub-basin defined by coordinates, not state boundaries,
in which each state could access its equal share of the shared pool water from
anywhere in the sub-basin. For the Dormant Commerce Clause, the District
argued that the language of the Oklahoma anti-diversion statute for out-of-state
entities was discriminatory. Additionally, it argued that there should be a rule
to look at legislative history instead of the states' rights.
Next, Waring discussed OWRB's arguments. The OWRB's main argument was that the District did not have the authority to enter into Oklahoma
physically to divert water for use in Texas. Furthermore, the OWRB argued
that the twenty-five percent allocation of sub-basin five in the Compact meant
twenty-five percent of the water within the state's own boundaries, not anywhere
in the sub-basin. The OWRB argued that states don't relinquish sovereignty
lightly and that whenever a state allows cross-border rights, they are always expressed with clear language. Finally, the OWRB argued that the donnant Commerce Clause does not apply to "allocated" water and that if anything, Texas's
past efforts to buy that water cut against the District's argument that it was entided to the water.
Next, Patrick and Waring dove into the Supreme Court case and Justice
Sotomayor's 2013 decision. The Court affinred the Tenth Circuit decision on
different grounds. The key rulings, according to Waring, were that the Court
agreed with the OWRB's argument that a state retains sovereignty over water
resources within its boundaries, that the District's past conduct in attempting to
purchase water from Oklahoma demonstrated no cross-border rights, and
therefore the District could divert up to twenty-five percent of water in sub-basin
five within Texas, but not from Oklahoma.
In their conclusion, Patrick and Waring reiterated that it would have been
interesting to see the factual record developed had the case gone to trial. Additionally, they shortly discussed how the lack of language on state boundaries and
border-crossings in the Compact played an important role throughout the case.
Finally, the attorneys closed by outlining the key takeaways from the case and
from their discussion before taking questions from the attendees.
Joshua Oden
WHAT'S AT STAKE IN THE NEGOTIATION AND LITIGATION OF
INTERSTATE WATER COMPACTS?
The final panel of the Symposium reflected on all the concepts discussed
throughout the day, and provided great insight for the future of interstate water
compacts.
ProfessorJason Robinson of the University of Wyoming Law School, moderated the three-member panel through a series of pre-scripted questions and
insightful answers from each of the panelists. The panel included: David Robbins of Hill and Robbins, P.C.; Chad Wallace of the Office of the Colorado
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Attorney General; and Christine Klein of the University of Florida Levin College of Law.
Question 1: "Broadly speaking, what do you view as the most significant
shortcomings in the processes by which existing interstate water compacts were
negotiated?"
Klein, bringing her perspective from her current work in Florida, said that
past compact negotiators "ignored the hard stuff," and suggested that future negotiations should address those difficult issues while momentum driving the negotiations exists. Wallace next observed that existing compacts did not "leave
enough room" to address future water uses between the parties, such as groundwater use developments and hydrologic interactions. Robbins concluded by
reiterating Wallace's observations. He also addressed the fact that existing compacts do not generally include effective dispute resolution mechanisms or grievance processes.
Question 2: "How exactly have these shortcomings in the negotiations been
detrimental to the composition and achninistration of existing compacts?" "
Robbins answered first, continuing his line of thought from the last question. He stated that sovereigns do not want to "give up sovereignty unless they
do it intentionally and by their own control." With this understanding, Robbins
argued that earlier compact negotiations failed to establish dispute resolution
mechanisms because these mechanisms intrude on state sovereignty and are
outside that state's decision-making control. Wallace agreed with Robbins and
observed an unwillingness in party states to engage in dispute resolution in the
face of ambiguities or unforeseen challenges in the compact's administration.
Wallace reiterated the difficulties in finding mechanisms to address groundwater use on surface flow.
Klein furthered the conversation on dispute resolution mechanisms by using the Delaware River Basin Compact as an example: the commission implementing that compact has the authority to regulate withdrawal permits, rather
than the states. She then discussed the St. Lawrence-Great Lakes Compact that
creates "common minimum standards" and some adjudicatory authority of the
commission to address disputes. Using these more recent compacts, Klein suggested that eastern states that do not have a history of, nor existing, compacts,
can look to these unique approaches for problem-solving as.they craft new compacts. For example, Klein suggested new compacts could be "tailored" to the
"character and flavor and history of the states involved." Wallace again reminded the audience that compacts are voluntary concessions of state sovereignty, and those compacting states can engage in that process however best
meets their needs.
Question 3: "What is the most important lesson you believe can be gleaned
from interstate water compact litigation in the U.S. Supreme Court over the past
two decades?"
Wallace joked that "the justices don't really like to see us." He stressed
that, because litigation can lead to rigid imposed apportionments, the threat of
litigation is an effective tool to "get everyone's attention" and bring stakeholders
to the negotiating table. Klein emphasized the importance of personalities and
personal relationships in compact administration because "compacts are a marriage to death do us part." Robbins strongly agreed with Wallace's previous
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observation that courts interpret compacts as contracts. Robbins further argued

that such interpretations cannot account for issues of state sovereignty. Finally,
Robbins reminded the audience that there is no "right answer" in interstate water compacts and that compacts are "about making a deal" between sovereigns.
Question 4: "Do you anticipate an increase or decrease in interstate water
compact litigation in the future, and which factors do you consider most determinative?"
Wallace expressed optimism that compact administrators are learning to
work collaboratively and "keep their options open." He referred back to his
earlier point, that litigation will likely be a tool to induce negotiations between
parties. Robbins, without making an express prediction, remarked that "serious
litigation" on a compact "only happens once; after that, you risk contempt [of
court] for not complying" with the imposed judgment.
Question 5: "To what extent, if any, do you anticipate new interstate water
compacts will be forned in the future, and which considerations underpin your
prognosis?"
Klein addressed this question, discussing in detail her knowledge of current
negotiations over the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint ("ACF") system among
Alabama, Florida, and Georgia. Klein suggested that these states could "learn
from the Western experience" because of the West's robust history with compact negotiation and litigation. Klein also suggested that the ACF states have
the opportunity to negotiate a compact or equitable apportionment that can
"fold in" contemporary concerns, such as the Endangered Species Act and
groundwater use, that plague western compacts negotiated before these concerns arose.
Question 6: "How likely is it existing interstate water compacts will be
amended or renegotiated in the future? Which factors do you consider most
significant to the initiation and success of such efforts?"
Wallace asserted that renegotiation of existing compacts "just won't happen." Existing compacts, for their shortfalls, are a significant foundation for
those resources; any negotiations or amendments would, Wallace posited, "fill
in the gaps." Robbins then said that, from the perspective of state sovereignty,
any renegotiation or significant amendment to existing compacts would require
states to "give up something." The states would have to change their existing
relationships vis--vis concessions of state sovereignty. Robbins also discussed
the ability of compact commissions to adopt regulations that govern the administration and implementation of the compacts, and he used the Rio Grande and
the Arkansas as two examples of such commission regulations. He suggested
that retaining these existing mechanisms is both more likely and more preferable to complete renegotiation. Wallace then reiterated the need for compact
administrators to build trust and respectful personal relationships amongst
themselves. Robbins concluded the scripted questions with a reminder that,
while not preferable, any negotiator must be ready and willing to litigate in the
event that negotiations fail.
The floor then opened for audience questions. One audience member
posed a hypothetical question and asked if severe drought, similar to the
drought in Australia, would force the renegotiation of the Colorado River Compact. Robbins assured the audience that the Colorado River Compact already
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addresses shortages, so renegotiation, even in the face of severe drought, would
be unnecessary. Wallace agreed, and further said that such an event would not
force compact parties to allocate water differently because all would already be
receiving less under the shortage allocations in the compact.
The next question from the audience inquired into the possibility of a compact specifically for the Ogallala Aquifer. Robbins believed such a compact
would be unlikely because of the very different uses of the aquifer by the three
overlaying states, and because the Supreme Court decisions on the Republican
and Arkansas litigation posited that existing compacts already address groundwater use. Klein expressed similar skepticism, and described a case between
Mississippi and Tennessee regarding different uses and contested ownership of
a common aquifer. Wallace then pointed to the Colorado Supreme Court case
of In Re: the Application for Water Rights of Paik County Sportsinen"5Ranch
as an example of the inclusion of groundwater aquifers in existing compacts and
use laws.
Robinson thanked the audience and the panel, and with the conclusion of
this panel came the end of the 2016 Symposium.
A ubrey Berram

